EU Public Procurement Policy During Covid-19: A Turning Point for Legitimate EU Governance?

Public procurement is a policy area located between two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the European Commission strives for greater competition to widen procurement markets. On the other hand, the boosting of competition encounters resistance among the member states. This article investigates how these colliding tendencies played out during the initial stages of the Covid-19 crisis and, more specifically, how changes in the field of procurement affected legitimate governance in the EU. Based on institutionalist and EU governance theories, the study contributes to the literature with three principal findings. First, it demonstrates that the pandemic enabled exogenously driven changes in the field of public procurement with new policies and guidelines, while the EU’s overall aims in this field were upheld. Second, the study demonstrates that the Commission was the main driver of change and that it enhanced the harmonisation of procurement rules and supranational integration despite the crisis. Third, while these changes strengthened the role of supranational actors, the study demonstrates that the changes introduced allow member states increased flexibility when it comes to the implementation. In practice, however, this flexibility has the potential to undermine the EU’s initial aims, thereby jeopardising the EU’s legitimacy.

Ex Ante Governance in the European Union: Energy and climate policy as a ‘test run’ for the post-pandemic recovery

This paper asks what policy tools the European Commission used to push member states to align their national post-pandemic recovery preferences with its own preferences for the green (and digital) recovery. It claims that the Commission did not create new policy tool in response to the crisis, but utilised an existing one, previously successfully tested in climate and energy policy. This tool, ex ante governance, developed under the 2018 Governance Regulation, enabled the Commission to influence member states' national goals (defined in their National Energy and Climate Plans) before they were formally adopted. The Commission's main aim was to link the national targets with the 2030 climate and energy goals binding at the EU level. Ex ante governance helped the Commission achieve this linkage as it pushed member countries to commit to more ambitious national targets than they had originally intended. This enabled the EU27 to reach a commitment level that will support the 2030 climate and energy goals set at the EU level. This modus operandi contrasts with the previous ex post assessment process that was ineffective;the original rules on the Intergovernmental Agreements have revealed the limitations of this approach. Due to its success the Commission applied the ex ante governance model to the post-pandemic recovery, where it wanted to align member states' national preferences (presented in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans) with its green (and other) recovery objectives. Such a development indicates the emergence of a complex ex ante governance within the EU.